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Using a new set of data from Greek Army sources, US military archives and Communist Party 
documents, the paper provides a quantitative analysis of the armed confrontation that took place in 
Greece during 1946-1949. A dynamic Lotka-Volterra model is estimated, pointing to the existence of a 
conflict trap that explains the prolongation of the civil war and its dire consequences for the country. A 
regional analysis finds that the mobilization of guerrilla forces was crucially affected by morphology 
and the local persecutions of political rivals. Using neoclassical growth-accounting, the economic cost 
of the conflict is estimated to surpass an annual GDP, in line with similar findings in contemporary civil 
wars. The same framework is employed to assess the outcome in counterfactual situations discussed in 
the paper. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Greek Civil War (GCW) took place during 1946-1949 between the Communist Party 
of Greece (KKE) and a coalition Government of centre and rightwing parties, and had 
dramatic and lasting consequences for the country in general and the economy in 
particular. In comparison with other national tragedies, the human carnage in the Civil 
War exceeded the toll of battle-deaths that occurred during the Italian and German 
invasions in 1940-1941. In the first place, the Greek National Army (GNA) appeared to 
be vastly superior in size and equipment and this meant that it was unwinnable by the 
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guerrilla army. However, this was not translated to a clear advantage in the mountainous 
battlefields where the experienced fighters of the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) 
proved to be undefeatable.  
As a result, a stalemate soon emerged whereby the effort of one side to win was matched 
by the opponent’s endurance and this led to the perpetuation of hostilities. By the end of 
the second year of fighting each side struggled to expand forces, acquire more resources, 
and obtain more support from the superpowers of the time; the Government from the US, 
while the guerrillas from the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. But despite 
the upgrading and spreading of fighting, no side gained a clear advantage over the other 
and a new stalemate prevailed, albeit this time at a much higher level of human losses 
and destruction.  
These developments point to the existence of a ‘conflict trap’ in which the adversaries got 
stuck for nearly two more years, before a major offensive by the Government led to the 
capitulation of guerrillas and the termination of hostilities.  The cost to the economy was 
immense as -on top of battle losses and widespread destruction of production units- there 
had been a massive exodus of defeated guerrillas and their sympathizers in order to avoid 
further persecutions. In the meanwhile, the geopolitical position of the country was 
seriously affected: instead of sharing the peace dividend of the postwar era, Greece 
became a test case of Cold War antagonism that shaped domestic politics for years to 
come. Political segregation lasted for a quarter century, making Greece a hotbed of 
authoritarianism culminated in a brutal dictatorship in 1967, before a liberal democracy 
was finally restored in 1974. 
Amid many questions that are still pending on why and how the civil war erupted, there 
is a central paradox regarding the intensity and perseverance of the conflict. Ex post, it 
seems obvious that an early termination of hostilities could be beneficial for both sides, 
especially if one takes into account that the country had just exited another catastrophic 
war and prospects were naturally being expected to improve and provide more 
opportunities for all. But instead of opting for a constitutional power sharing, the 
adversaries engaged in a prolonged conflict with enormous consequences in human, 
economic and political terms. 
To investigate these issues, the present paper explores the following aspects of the Greek 
Civil War: first, it examines the dynamics of fighting and the existence and stability of a 
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conflict trap. A modified version of the Lotka-Voltera model is set up to reflect battle 
dynamics in a realistic way and allow for non-trivial conflict equilibria.  The parameters 
of the model are estimated by econometric techniques and compared with actual 
developments in the battlefield. Moreover, the regional aspects of the conflict are 
examined to see whether they were influenced by geographical morphology and local 
persecutions. 
Second, it assesses the cost incurred in the Greek economy due to the vast destruction of 
the labor force, capital stock and livestock during the Civil War. By applying neoclassical 
growth accounting, the GDP losses during and after the conflict are determined and then 
compared with similar estimates on other civil wars to obtain a measure of the severity 
and long lasting consequences of GCW. The accounting framework is used to evaluate 
how much of such a cost could have been avoided on the counterfactual hypothesis of an 
earlier termination of hostilities. 
The above objectives require coherent and systematic data series. To overcome their 
inadequacy or unavailability, new data series on battle casualties and persecutions 
covering the period 1946-1949 were compiled at a monthly frequency.  This became 
possible by systematically recording detailed –though scattered- evidence that was found 
in Greek military reviews, the US military archives and various reports recently 
published by the Communist Party of Greece.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
civil wars in general and the Greek Civil War in particular. Section 3 provides a statistical 
analysis of battle data and establishes that the conflict should be examined in two phases 
to account for the escalation of fighting after 1947. Section 4 describes a dynamic model 
of conflict and examines the conditions under which a perpetuation of hostilities may 
occur. Section 5 presents an econometric estimation of the model and discusses its 
properties along with actual political and military developments in Greece at that time. In 
Section 6, a Cobb-Douglas production function is used to assess the cost in the economy 
and to which extent this could have been avoided by an earlier termination of hostilities. 
Section 7 presents the main findings and conclusions. The paper is followed by two 
supplements: Appendix A includes sources, definitions and data series, while the key 
properties of conflict models are described in detail in Appendix B. 
 
4 
 
 
2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
Academic research on civil wars is thriving and ranges from meticulous collection and 
analysis of actual conflicts to theoretical models that explain their motivation and 
dynamics. Alongside, a methodology for assessing their economic and social 
consequences has been developed.  
 
In modeling conflict situations, a large variety of approaches is available and a 
comprehensive review can be found in Lichbach (1992). There, more than two hundred 
scholarly contributions are grouped into two broad categories: one includes those 
following the rational choice optimizing framework, and the other those employing 
stochastic models of conflict. The first body of literature focuses on the root-causes of a 
conflict and -by using cross country or regional panel data- tests its intensity against 
various explanatory variables. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2001), an individual 
participates in an insurgence if expected gains outweigh the costs of engagement plus 
benefits foregone by abandoning current activities. In a similar line of thought, Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) argue that violence is escalated when repression is poorly enforced, 
thus reducing the cost of insurgency and increasing expected payoffs for participants. In 
contrast, Sambanis (2002) criticizes the opportunity-cost model by arguing that the 
escalation of repression leads to larger-scale hostilities rather than suppressing them. 
The second framework studies the dynamics of fighting by employing variants of Lotka-
Volterra models. Though originally devised to study species interactions, these models 
soon were found useful in studying human rivalry generated by a variety of factors: such 
as by class-struggle (e.g. Goodwin, 1967), the arms race (e.g. Richardson, 1960), political 
competition (e.g. Francisco, 1996), riots (e.g. Burbeck et al, 1978) or outright revolution 
(e.g. Tsebelis and  Sprague, 1989). More recently, a new strand in the quantitave 
literature assumes that battle casualties follow power-law distributions and the duration 
of conflict can be indicated by their complementary cumulative distribution function 
(ccdf).1  The most-commonly used is the Pareto distribution, and in this case the 
probability of casualties (X) exceeding a certain level (x) is given as: 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋 ≥ 𝑥) = (𝑥/ℎ)−𝜆     (1) 
                                                          
1 This is frequently called the ‘survivor’ function, but here the term is unsuitable for describing battle deaths. 
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where (λ) is the conflict index and (h) represents a lower bound of fatalities, i.e. prob(X > 
h)=1. The higher the index (λ), the less likely a large number of casualties will occur so 
as to lead to the termination of conflict. Using a large cross section of fatality data, 
Clauset et al (2007) show that they follow a Pareto distribution with an index equal to 
λ=2.50, which is taken to express a global constant of conflict. Bohorquez et al (2009) go 
a step further and relate power-law distributions with other confrontational phenomena, 
from ecology to finance and to social dynamics. As noted by Lichbach (1992), such an 
atheoretical approach amounts to claiming that conflicts occur randomly, in sharp 
contrast with the schools of thought that interpret them as outcomes of rational 
calculation or a response to grievances. If anything, such contrasting views underline not 
just the vast possibilities open to researchers but also the huge gap that still divides 
alternative approaches to analyzing the dynamics of conflict and quantifying its effect. 
A stalemate in a civil conflict is attributed to the failure of the adversaries to negotiate 
effectively, either because agreements lack an enforcement technology or there is 
uncertainty about true motives of the opponent due to incomplete and asymmetric 
information. Skarpedas (2008) argues that the ability to enforce negotiated contracts 
between competing groups is weakened by various factors ranging from geography and 
ethnicity to external intervention. This makes the option for war as a means of 
appropriating power to look more appealing even if the cost of engagement is multiplied. 
In Cunningham (2013), indirect negotiations may fail because outside mediators may 
have ulterior motives beyond just ending the fighting, while Acemoglou and Wolitzky 
(2014) argue that incomplete information about rival’s intentions may lead one side to 
interpret noisy signals as opportunistic tactics by the other. Thus it may opt to respond in 
a similar manner and, finally, each side maximizes its own aggression leading to ‘conflict 
spirals’.  
 
In assessing the economic legacy of a civil conflict, neoclassical growth theory can be 
employed to determine how the destruction of factors of production affects growth. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) estimate that a civil war incurs a loss totaling between 90% 
and 105% of a year’s GDP. The growth-inflicting list of a civil war may also include the 
disruption of markets, curtailment of trade and deterrence of foreign investment. 
Furthermore, additional costs are incurring from the deterioration of productive 
infrastructure caused either by physical destruction or under-financing as Government 
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resources increasingly go for military procurement; see, for example, Murdoch and 
Sandler (2004).  
 
In contrast to the prolific literature on civil conflicts worldwide, research on the Greek 
Civil War is rather narrow and idiosyncratic. Despite a plethora of contributions on the 
political and ideological issues pertaining GCW as well as a vast anecdotal evidence on 
individual battle episodes, a systematic analysis of the dynamics and consequences of the 
conflict is lacking. One reason was certainly political: for nearly three decades the only 
publicly available view was that of the winners, until it was reversed by a wave of left-
wing interpretations that prevailed after 1974. It was only during the last two decades that 
key historical episodes have been scrutinized and a more balanced approach was adopted; 
see, for example, the collections by Baerentzen et al (1987), Iatrides and Wrigley (1995), 
Koutsoukis and Sakkas (2001), Nikolakopoulos et al (2002), among others.  
The key impediment, however, was the inadequacy of existing data series on 
socioeconomic and military developments, due both to the official secrecy surrounding 
the conduct of the warfare as well as the fateful decision of the Greek Government in 
1989 to destroy historical archives related to the Civil War.2 Some quantitative evidence 
on GCW can be found in Margaritis (2000) where military and economic aspects of the 
conflict are described - though not in a formal framework. Marantzidis (2010) provides 
extensive information on the logistics of the guerrilla army, while particular aspects of 
the Civil War are quantitatively approached in Nikolakopoulos et al (2002). A discussion 
of some economic aspects of the Civil War is presented in Babanassis (2001), while its 
long run implications on the structure of the economy are examined by Thomadakis 
(1995). A path-breaking exception was the field research conducted by Kalyvas (2006) 
that led to the reconstruction of conflict data series and enabled a formal analysis on the 
origins and mechanisms of violence in the GCW. This, however, covered only one 
prefecture of Greece, thus aggregate or regional-wide comparisons cannot be undertaken.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The Herostratian decision was taken in 1989 by a short-lived Government of the conservative and the 
communist parties on the naïve expectation that national reconciliation is better achieved by eliminating historical 
records rather than by studying and trying to understand the course of history.  
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3. CONFLICT DATA AND PERIODICITY 
The main developments in the Greek Civil War are shown in Fig. 1 that displays monthly 
time series of battle-deaths and total battle-casualties3 of DAG and GNA during the 
period from January 1946 until December 1949. The first issue is to define the starting 
and the termination dates of the conflict. Though there is a widespread belief that 
confrontations started on the eve of the elections in March 1946, it is clear that during the 
first half of 1946 casualties remained too low to qualify for a Civil War. For the present 
purposes, it is assumed that the Civil War started in July 1946 when open confrontation 
tactics were simultaneously adopted by the two adversaries. In response to widespread 
persecutions by rightwing militias, the Communist Party started to organize ‘self-
defense’ groups throughout Greece,4 and this prompted the Government to set up 
emergency martial courts to prosecute acts against “public order and safety”.5 In 
response, the formation of the “Democratic Army of Greece” was formally announced in 
October 1946.  The conflict was concluded by the final offensive in August 1949, though 
sporadic hostilities continued for a few more months. The end of the Civil War is here set 
in September 1949 when the official surrender of DAG was signed. 
 
[Table 1, here] 
Statistical analysis 
Some key conflict statistics are summarized in Table 1. Reflecting the escalation of the 
conflict, both time series of battle deaths and casualties are found to be non-stationary by 
a unit root test. Losses rise sharply in the beginning of 1947 when DAG forces attack 
several towns6 and GNA launches the first wave of military operations to clear their 
holdings in the mountains.7 
                                                          
3 Battle deaths and casualties include all people, combatant and civilian, that are killed or injured in armed 
engagements.  
4 The decision was initially taken in June 1945, by the 12th Plenary of KKE; see Rizospastis (2011, p149). 
5 The Third Decree of the State was issued in July 1946 and initially established eleven martial courts in key 
cities. A few months later the number rose to 30, covering most of the country. 
6 For an account of town sieges by the guerrilla army see Marantzidis (2010, p 192). 
7 The main army operations were ‘Falcon-Ierax’ and ‘Stork-Pelargos’ (4/1947), ‘Eagle-Aetos’ (5/1947), ‘Swan-
Kyknos’ (6/1947) and ‘Crow-Korax’ (5-8/1947). Casualties are given by GES (1976) and GES (1980) as 
described in Appendix A. 
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[Fig.1 here] 
By the end of 1947, the conflict intensifies and acquires new operational and political 
dimensions. Letting a simple time-trend to remove non-stationarity and applying Chow 
tests, a structural break is detected at the beginning of 1948 and this leads to a periodicity 
of two phases:8 the first phase lasts from July 1946 to December 1947 and the second 
from January 1948 to September 1949.  
Comparing the battle statistics in the two phases, a crucial change concerning the extent 
and nature of the conflict is revealed: the monthly average of battle-deaths increases 
fourfold, while that of total casualties rises more than eightfold.  In Phase II, the volatility 
expressed as the ratio of standard deviation to the mean drops to less than half the size in 
Phase I, suggesting that the earlier pattern of widespread skirmishes gave way to larger-
scale confrontations.   
Finally, data are tested against a Pareto distribution to see whether the analysis of power-
law models as described in the previous section is relevant for the GCW. As shown in 
Table 1, the conflict index (λ) in the first Phase is found to be substantially lower than the 
2.50 value which applies for long term confrontations. A possible interpretation is that 
larger-scale events were becoming more likely, in line with the quick escalation of 
conflict during that period. In Phase II, the index is found to be 1.55 for battle-deaths and 
1.60 for total casualties, close to the estimates of 1.70 found by Bohorquez et al (2009) 
for the US and the Spanish civil wars. The finding suggests that GCW was turning into a 
major repetitive conflict, as in fact proved to be the case in the second Phase.  
 
Army restructuring and conflict escalation  
The conflict escalation in the beginning of 1948 was preceded by extensive 
operationalization and enlargement of both armies as shown in Fig. 2. The state army was 
steadily increasing and by the end of 1947 had reached 120,000 men from 92,000 men in 
the beginning of the year. But despite this enlargement, the state army proved incapable 
of swiftly containing guerrilla forces. Numerical supremacy of GNA was compromised in 
                                                          
8 The hypothesis of no breakpoint between January and March 1948 is rejected at a range of levels from 1% to 
10% for total casualties and battle-deaths as shown in Table 1. 
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practice as many of its forces were allocated in non-combatant duties, while others were 
untrained and/or inadequately equipped for fighting on a mountainous terrain; see 
Marantzidis (2010, p 92) and Averof (2010, p 208).  Gregoriadis (2011, p 166) deplores 
the increase as no more than a “nervous acceleration”, and it was only after 1947 that 
such drawbacks were decisively corrected. In the US, the ‘Truman Doctrine’ against the 
expansion of Soviet influence had been proclaimed and, soon, a special mission was set 
up to provide the state army with modern arms and training. 
 [Fig.2 here] 
In 1948, GNA went further up to 132,000 men, while military shipments from the US 
were multiplied; see Fig. 3. Combat drilling became more demanding and non-combatant 
duties were delegated to the National Guard Battalions. At the same time, the political 
cleansing of the army intensified: left-leaning soldiers were massively transferred to 
isolated islands, and hundreds of officers were court-martialed for alleged communist 
infiltration.9 Finally, a high US command arrived in Athens in February 1948 to directly 
coordinate military operations. This marked a radically new course in the civil war, both 
operationally and regarding the geopolitical repercussions on the ensuing Cold War. 
 [Fig.3 here] 
Following a parallel –though definitely source-constrained– process, DAG was trying to 
expand its force and improve logistics.  Neighboring Balkan states were offering military 
training and backyard facilities to retreating DAG fighters. Substantial military 
equipment was shipped from Poland and other Eastern European countries to DAG in 
1948-1949 in an effort to counter the improved capabilities of GNA; details are given in 
Marantzidis (2010, pp 48-49). At the same time, DAG was extensively restructured to 
cover the mainland as well as the islands so that the conflict soon spread all over the 
country.10  
To check the size of DAG from rising any further, more than 350,000 villagers were 
displaced from their land and transferred to refugee camps around cities in Northern 
Greece during 1948 and 1949. The Government presented the operation as protecting 
                                                          
9 The most notorious concentration camp was at Makronisos where 28,800 soldiers and officers were kept during 
1947-1950. Though the Government hailed the camp as a ‘moral transforming institution’, several of the interns 
perished out of torture and starvation; for an account see Kaltsogia-Tournaviti (2001, p 72). 
10 Details of the new structure in DAG are given by Kyritsis (2006, p 28). 
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“bandit-stricken” villagers from plunder, though KKE claimed11 that it was a scorched 
earth policy aiming  “to undercut provisions, recruitments and the intelligence system of 
DAG”; for a detailed account see Laiou (1987, p 61). Averof (2010, p 237) argues that, at 
the beginning, villagers were voluntarily fleeing their homes to escape terror and it was 
only after 1948 that the operation was extended and centrally organized. Whatever the 
motivation, displacements severely undercut DAG recruitments and this may be one of 
the reasons that its forces could not increase any further after 1948; Fig. 4 displays a 
strong negative correlation between displacements and increases in the DAG forces. 
[Fig.4 here] 
As the two armies were getting larger, military and political strategies became more 
ambitious for both the Government and the communists alike. In December 1947 the 
latter formed a ‘Provisional Government’ and launched their first tactical warfare 
operation to proclaim Konitsa –a town near the northern borders- as the capital of 
‘liberated territories’. After two weeks of intense fighting the offensive was defeated, and 
subsequently the strategy of DAG concentrated on the war in the countryside.12 Days 
after the battle was concluded, the Communist Party as well as all fellow organizations 
were outlawed and a massive purge of militants swept the country.13 Emergency martial 
courts were established in several more cities and procedures became swifter and stiffer; 
as a result prosecutions doubled in 1948 and death penalties increased threefold, as 
manifested in Fig. 5.  
[Fig.5 here] 
These developments further fuelled hostilities and undermined the chances of a 
negotiated end to the conflict. For example, the evacuees in the rural areas developed a 
strong opposition against DAG and several of them volunteered to fight against guerrillas 
for being the reason they were taken away from their land. On the other hand, the wave 
of prosecutions created a potential pool for guerrilla recruits as several would-be suspects 
opted for joining DAG in the mountains rather than being court-martialed. In the 
beginning of 1948 it was clear that both the Government and the guerrillas were moving 
toward a prolonged and deadly confrontation as analyzed in Section 5.  
                                                          
11  Rizospastis (2011, p 457). 
12 Rizospastis (2011, p 290). That was the first open disagreement about strategy, with the DAG leader supporting 
the partisan fighting and the Secretary General of KKE insisting on urban struggle. 
13 For a description see Rizospastis (2011, p 292).  
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4. MODELING THE CONFLICT TRAP 
A commonly used framework to model interactions between two groups is the Lotka-
Volterra model, in which the evolution of each party depends on the size of, or the 
actions by, the other. In biological applications, variables represent species populations, 
though in conflict or otherwise competing situations they may express the outcome of the 
adversarial actions; for example in studying epidemic models, Epstein (1997) used the 
infective and susceptible populations, while in modeling civil conflicts in Europe, 
Francisco (2009) used variables denoting the casualties of each side. Regarding military 
confrontations, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) suggest that by using battle casualties rather 
than army populations, a more reliable assessment of the conflict is obtained. Following 
this line, the dynamics of the Greek conflict are expressed by a set of difference equations 
describing battle casualties of the guerrilla army (Rt) and the state army (St) as below: 
∆𝑅𝑡 = −𝛼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑅𝑡−1𝑆𝑡 + 𝜃 + 𝜉𝑡    (2a) 
∆𝑆𝑡 = −𝛾𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑆𝑡−1𝑅𝑡 + 𝜑+𝜁𝑡     (2b) 
Subscripts denote time periods (t), Δ is first-differencing, (ξ,ζ) are white noise processes, 
and Greek-letter parameters reflect fighting characteristics. The first terms in the rhs of 
the above equations denote how the rise in casualties of each army is influenced by its 
own past losses: if parameters (α,γ) are positive, they denote “survival rates” as each 
army gradually learns how to contain fatalities by better training and defense-building; if 
negative they denote “own-attrition” rates due to fight fatigue or loss of critical units.  
The second terms in the rhs express the “firing effectiveness” of the adversary as in the 
terminology introduced by Epstein (1997, Ch. 2). They are increasing in past own-
casualties as these make the combatant to be more vulnerable, and in the intensification 
of the aggression which is assumed to be proportional to the casualties suffered by the 
aggressor.  Scaling coefficients (β,δ) may differ for the two sides because of different 
firing capabilities; for example, the deployment of air-force by the state army is expected 
to lead to a firing effectiveness coefficient much higher than that of the guerrillas, i.e. 
β>δ.  
Finally, (θ,φ) represent exogenous adverse factors for the guerrilla and state armies 
respectively. For example, rough terrain for untrained troops, insufficient medical care or 
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deterioration of logistics may steadily raise the toll in the battle. If negative, they indicate 
steady improvements. As the logistics of the state army were more frequently replenished 
and clearly outperformed those of the guerrillas, it is expected that φ <θ. As battles 
intensified after 1948, adversity factors are expected to rise for both armies during the 
second Phase of the Civil War. 
 
Conflict equilibria 
A conflict trap is defined as a situation where fighting is recurring without any side 
gaining an advantage decisive enough so as to capitulate its opponent. In terms of model 
(2), such a stalemate is represented by an asymptotically stable equilibrium (R*, S*) and 
is found by setting ΔR=ΔS=0, rearranging and solving the system:  
𝑆∗ =
𝛼
𝛽
−
𝜃
𝛽𝑅∗
      (3a) 
𝑆∗ =
𝜑
𝛾−𝛿𝑅∗
      (3b) 
 
[Fig. 6a, b, here] 
 
A graphical display of (3a, 3b) in Fig. 6a shows that there might be up to two stalemate 
equilibria. From (3a, 3b) a second-order equation is obtained and the sign of the 
discriminant determines the existence of positive equilibria. The following Propositions 
are easily established: 
Proposition 1: Two positive equilibria exist if and only if the combination of survival 
rates is either too low or too high, i.e. one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
√𝛼𝛾 <  |√𝛽𝜑 − √𝛿𝜃|      (4a) 
or 
√𝛼𝛾 > √𝛽𝜑 + √𝛿𝜃        (4b) 
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Proposition 2: No positive equilibrium exists if the survival rates are in the intermediate 
range:  
 |√𝛽𝜑 − √𝛿𝜃| < √𝛼𝛾 < √𝛽𝜑 + √𝛿𝜃    (5)    
Proposition 3: A unique positive equilibrium exists if and only if one of the conditions 
(4a, 4b) holds as equality. 
Proofs are given in Appendix B. Permissible areas for the existence of stalemate 
equilibrium are shown in Fig.6b. The characteristics roots that drive the dynamics of the 
system are the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady-state (R*, S*) as 
follows: 
𝐽(𝑅∗, 𝑆∗) = [
𝜕𝑅𝑡
𝜕𝑅𝑡−1
𝜕𝑅𝑡
𝜕𝑆𝑡−1
𝜕𝑆𝑡
𝜕𝑅𝑡−1
𝜕𝑆𝑡
𝜕𝑆𝑡−1
] =
1
𝛺
∙ [
1 −
𝜃
𝑅∗
𝛽𝑅∗(1 −
𝜑
𝑆∗
)
𝛿𝑆∗(1 −
𝜃
𝑅∗
) 1 −
𝜑
𝑆∗
]   (6a) 
with expression (Ω) defined as: 
𝛺 ≜ 1 − 𝛽𝛿𝑅∗𝑆∗       (6b) 
Convergence to stalemate equilibrium requires that eigenvalues have a module below 
unity,14 while complex roots imply limit cycles. Since expressions are nonlinear, results 
are only obtained numerically.  
The above framework differs from the classical Lotka-Volterra settings  in three 
important aspects: first, instead of making the unrealistic assumption that an army’s 
current casualties are determined by the opponent’s past losses, the present model  allows 
for contemporaneous interactions between the two combatants as happens in an actual 
battle.   
Second, it allows for exogenous factors to influence both the path of events and the size 
and nature of the steady-state. The autonomous conflict is obtained as a special case by 
letting θ=φ=0. Some models (e.g. Francisco, 2009) unrealistically assume that a 
prolonged conflict has only autonomous dynamics and remains immune from the external 
environment. This may suit to in vitro biological experiments, but hardly is a sensible 
                                                          
14 The characteristic equation takes the form z2-bz+c=0, where (b) is calculated as the trace and (c) as the 
determinant of the Jacobian. A necessary and sufficient condition for two stable roots is |b|<1+c<2, no matter if 
they are real or complex. 
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assumption for actual wars. Moreover, autonomous systems with lagged interactions 
preclude the existence of stable non-trivial steady-states as shown in Appendix B. 
Therefore, they are unsuitable to describe prolonged conflicts, unless a more complicated 
non-linear structure is assumed.15 
The third point has crucial implications for the existence of non-trivial conflict equilibria. 
In both the classical discrete-time framework with lagged interactions or the continuous-
time system with contemporaneous terms, a limit cycle is obtained only if parameters 
(α,γ) are of opposite sign. As noted by Zhang et al (2007) this happens in a situation with 
predator-prey patterns, and to assume that guerrillas (or the state army) are prepared to 
act as preys and still enter a civil war is rather awkward. In practice, it is more likely that 
a conflict is prolonged exactly because the two sides adopt similar rather than diverging 
fighting patterns.16 This asks for both parameters being similarly signed and is more 
suitable for modeling organized civil strife.   
 
5. ESTIMATION  
As shown in Section 3, a structural shift regarding the pattern of casualties took place at 
the beginning of 1948. Therefore, GCW should be separately examined in two phases: 
the first one covering the period from the breakout of the conflict in July 1946 to 
December 1947, while the second from January 1948 to September 1949 when it was 
concluded with the defeat of DAG. Using battle-deaths17 as the dependent variable, the 
model (2a, 2b) is separately estimated over the two phases and results are displayed in 
Table 2. The explanatory power is satisfactory, and all coefficients are found to be 
statistically significant and correctly signed. 
 
[Table 2, here] 
                                                          
15 For example, Din (2013) considers a non-linear autonomous discrete-time model in fractional form and shows 
that the non-trivial equilibrium is asymptotically stable only if several complicated conditions are imposed upon 
the parameters. 
16 Pointedly, Clausewitz (1976, p 480) was advising that a guerrilla war should not be conceived as an isolated 
process but ‘in the framework of a war conducted by the regular army’. 
17 Estimation was also carried out for battle casualties and results are similar to those reported for deaths. This is 
somehow embedded in the data as the figures for DAG fighters wounded in 1948-1949 were approximately set in 
the Government records to be three times that of deaths; estimation details are available by the author. 
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The main findings per phase of conflict are the following: 
 (i). The exogenous adverse factors (θ, φ) rise substantially in Phase II for both sides as 
the conflict becomes more aggressive. The rise, however, is more pronounced for DAG 
reflecting a deterioration of logistics and more impediments in tactical maneuvering after 
the closure of northern borders in 1949.   
(ii). Survival parameters (α,γ) are found to be nearly the same for both armies in Phase I, 
suggesting that vulnerability of state troops was close to that of the insurgents. This is 
explained by the fact that state losses included those of the Gendarmerie and other 
poorly-trained local militias that were fighting without a central coordination by GNA. 
The balance shifts in Phase II, in which survival rates hardly change for DAG but 
improve by nearly half for GNA (from -1.128 to -1.697) due to its increasing 
professionalization and the fact that all other forces were placed under its single 
operational command. 
(iii). The firing effectiveness (β) of GNA remains superior to that of DAG (δ) in both 
phases of the war. However, both decline in Phase II as the armies get better organized 
and the conflict now involves larger-scale and deadlier battles rather than skirmishes. It is 
noticeable, however, that the relative capability of GNA versus DAG (i.e. the ratio β/δ) 
falls substantially in Phase II from around sevenfold to twofold as a result of parameter β 
falling from 7.17 to 1.267. A Wald test reveals that the hypothesis of the two figures 
being the same is rejected only at the 14% level but nevertheless it is interesting to further 
inquire this finding. A possible reason is that during Phase I the state army basically was 
engaged in defensive operations18 and fought against guerrillas only when a clear 
advantage was confirmed; this entailed more guerrillas killed per GNA death and 
explains the large size of (β) in Phase I. When major operations were undertaken by GNA 
in 1948 and 1949, guerrillas managed to keep key strongholds and succeeded in causing 
severe losses in the state army, thus the lowering of (β). From Fig. 7, it is noticeable that 
the battle-death ratio of DAG to GNA remained close to the average for most of the time.  
[Fig.7 here] 
                                                          
18 This looked like a ‘situation being pregnant with disaster’, as figuratively is described by Clausewitz (1976,      
p 596). It arises when the army is ‘taking things the easy way – using superior force to filch some provinces, 
preferring the security of the minor conquest to a major success’.  
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The conflict trap in the GCW 
The findings of the econometric estimation imply that though GNA was virtually 
impossible to be won by the guerrillas, at the same time it was not capable of securing a 
quick victory over them either. DAG was severed by inadequate replenishment, poor 
training and widespread inoperability of equipment, and Marantzidis (2010, p 97) claims 
that under such adverse factors no army can last for long. However, DAG was still 
mastering low-scale and mountainous engagements, and this made the conflict to take 
several turns before terminating.19 
To determine possible stalemates, two non-zero steady-states are calculated for each set 
of estimated parameters; see Table 2. As the characteristic roots’ module exceeds unity, 
the higher equilibrium is found to be asymptotically unstable in both phases. In contrast, 
the lower equilibrium is asymptotically stable suggesting the presence of conflict traps in 
both phases. Tellingly, both traps are found to be close to the historical average of battle 
deaths occurring in each phase. This implies that the conflict could have had been 
perpetuated around these levels for much longer, if exogenous factors had not been 
drastically altered in the meanwhile.  
A turning point occurred in the autumn 1948 when GNA first cleared mountain Grammos 
but then failed to hold the neighboring Vitsi in northern Greece. The high toll of army 
casualties and the massive defections to DAG took Greek military leadership by surprise 
and demoralized its ranks.20 According to Woodhouse (1976, pp 144-145), the US 
mission was seriously considering to withdraw from Greece, and it was only after the 
visit of the State and Defense Secretaries to Athens in October 1948 that their 
engagement was reaffirmed. To regain control, the shaken Government appointed a 
hardliner veteran as Field Marshal and decided to plan new offensives against DAG 
strongholds.  
                                                          
19 That outcomes are not necessarily determined by army numbers was indignantly expressed by a Government 
supporter who was skeptical about “the alleged mathematical assertions … on so many more armies than bandits 
… How then it happens that the former do not snatch the latter from the neck, to finish them off?”; daily 
Kathimerini 30/1/1049, reprinted in Rizospastis (2011, pp 397-398). 
20 Averof (2010, pp 323-324) claims too that high ranking officials in the US were considering to opt out, while 
the Government was seriously contemplating defeat. 
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In 1949, three specific developments weakened DAG: first the leadership that favored 
partisan warfare was replaced by a team more eager to engage in large-scale operations, 
despite poor training and inferior equipment. Second, the logistic support to DAG from 
abroad was sharply diminished after the Soviet Union advised KKE leadership in April 
1949 to terminate hostilities.21 Third, DAG became more vulnerable after Yugoslavia 
sealed its borders in July 1949 and ceased to provide a safe backyard for retreating 
guerrillas.  
Even so, DAG was not easily succumbed. To resolve the impasse, an out-of-proportions 
escalation took place in the summer of 1949, exceeding all previous battles in every 
relevant aspect: human losses peaked for both sides as DAG losses –including those 
captured or surrendered– reached 71% of its total strength, while the GNA soldiers killed 
in the field increased threefold relative to the average in the previous two years. The air 
force was intensively involved in the operation and bombing reached unprecedented 
levels. It was this specific escalation combined with the logistical collapse of DAG that 
made its forces to be terminally defeated and the conflict trap to be resolved.22 
 
Regional formations 
As partisan warfare was adopted as the main form of the armed struggle, guerrillas were 
gathering in the mountains and set up regional headquarters. Data are available for the 
guerrilla forces in eleven HQs in January 1948, and for 21 HQs between March and 
August 1949. These data are used to analyze the spatial characteristics of the conflict in 
terms of morphology and local political grievances in the two phases of the war. Note, 
however, that the limited number of observations in 1948 makes results for the first 
period to be only indicative. 
A measure of political grievance is obtained by the number of state persecutions (PRSC) 
against local militants. In the first phase of the conflict, such purges during 1945-1946 
had been documented in a DAG Report submitted to the United Nations in 1948; see 
                                                          
21 According to his own testimony, the new DAG leader was notified in 20/4/1949 that “Stalin put forward the 
case for retreating, for ending the armed struggle”; quoted in Rizospastis (2011, p 449). 
22 The sweeping victory in Grammos was seen by many as vindicating the supremacy of military professionals 
over self-trained communist leaders who ignore fundamental principles of tactical war; see, for example, 
Tsakalotos (1971, p 317). Though factually true, the assertion should also include the huge material superiority as 
another critical factor. 
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Grammenos and Rodakis (1987). In the period ranging from 1949:03 to 1949:08, prior 
political grievances are measured by the number of citizens being prosecuted in the 
previous period 1946-1948 in the emergency martial courts of nearby towns; see 
Michiotis (2007). Details of data definitions and regional classifications so as to 
correspond to the positions of DAG HQs are given in Appendix A and summarized in 
Table 5. 
Morphology is measured by the altitude of mountains (MOUNT) where HQs were set up, 
and their distance from the northern border of Greece (DISTNB). Other morphology 
indices, such as forest density, land cultivation or country roads, were not found to be 
statistically significant and are not reported. The following equation for regional DAG 
concentrations is finally estimated: 
𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑆𝐶
𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇
𝑗  + 𝛽3𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑁𝐵
𝑗     (7) 
 
Variables are per headquarter j (j=1,…, 11 in the first stage and j=1,…,21 in the 
second), and constants (c j) denote region-specific fixed effects. The sign of estimated 
coefficients depends on the form of the armed struggle and the relationship between the 
guerrillas and neighboring states. Thus, (β1) would be negative if repression was 
effective in curtailing DAG recruitment and positive if it was counterproductive as 
discussed in Section 2. Coefficient (β2) is expected to be positive for a partisan warfare 
and negative if the struggle was mainly urban. Finally, (β3) would be negative if 
guerrillas were seeking refuge in neighboring states, and positive if the latter were allied 
with the Government and insurgents were handed over.  The cross-section estimates are 
shown in Table 3 and some interesting findings are revealed.  
 
[Table 3, here] 
A strong positive elasticity with respect to prosecutions is detected in both phases, 
confirming Sambanis (2002) that political repression is usually counterproductive. The 
coefficients suggest that nearly half as many of those being persecuted chose to join DAG 
and thus avoid further purges. Regarding morphology, results show that guerrilla 
concentrations were stronger in high mountains, in line with the partisan character of the 
conflict. It is noticeable that the distance from northern borders is not found significant in 
1948, as the strategy of DAG at that time was still promoting the conflict all over the 
country. The pattern changed in 1949 as DAG troops retreated in the northern part of 
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Greece and sought refuge in the communist Balkan states, thus the border effect is now 
found to be negative and significant.  
 
6. THE ECONOMIC COST OF THE GREEK CIVIL WAR 
The direct economic cost of the Civil War is estimated in GDP terms by calculating the 
destruction of production factors and the resulting suppression of growth brought about by 
the conflict. Assuming a production function with constant returns to scale, output in 
constant prices (Y) is given by: 
𝑌 = 𝐴(𝑘𝑁)𝜂𝑍𝜀𝐿1−𝜀−𝜂      (8) 
where A, N, k, Z and L denote technology, number of factories, capital stock per factory, 
rural livestock and total wage labor respectively. Parameters (η,ε) denote the elasticities of 
output with respect to the non-agricultural capital stock and livestock respectively. Let dN, 
dZ and dL denote the destruction of factories, livestock and employment respectively. Let (x) 
denote the proportional loss of output, i.e. the drop in growth rate from what it could have 
prevailed in the absence of the Civil War. Assuming for simplicity that technology (A) 
remained unaffected by the conflict (i.e. dA=0), and using subscript CW to denote the Civil 
War period, the drop is given by the well-known accounting equation: 
𝜓 =
𝑑𝑌𝐶𝑊
𝑌𝐶𝑊
= 𝜂
𝑑(𝑁𝐶𝑊𝑘)
(𝑁𝐶𝑊𝑘)
+ 𝜀
𝑑𝑍𝐶𝑊
𝑍𝐶𝑊
+ (1 − 𝜂 − 𝜀)
𝑑𝐿𝐶𝑊
𝐿𝐶𝑊
   (9) 
The above formula requires that factor destructions are calculated as proportions to their 
initial stocks, as described below: 
(i). Employment: Let (Pt) denote the active population in period t.  During the Civil War, 
active population (PCW) was reduced by the number of battle-deaths, severe battle-casualties, 
and by those sentenced to death or convicted to long-term internment. After the termination 
of fighting, it was further reduced by the guerrillas and their families who fled Greece to 
avoid further persecution. According to Table 4, the above losses amount to dPCW=-236,787 
persons. To obtain the losses in employment, it is further assumed that the proportion of 
unemployed (u) among those perished or expatriated was the same as in total active 
population. The nearest Census of active population took place in 1951 and reflected the 
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aforementioned reductions; therefore the loss in employment due to the civil war is 
calculated by the adjusted formula: 
𝑑𝐿𝐶𝑊
𝐿𝐶𝑊
=
(1−𝑢)∙𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑊
(1−𝑢)∙𝑃𝐶𝑊
=
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑊
𝑃𝐶𝑊
=
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑊
𝑃1951+𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑊
      (10) 
Using data from Table 4, the aggregate loss of employment is found to be -7.80%.  
[Table 4, here] 
(ii). Livestock: From Table 4, we have that the loss was dZCW= -1,480,669 animals.  The 
nearest data available for total livestock are from the agricultural Census in 1950, thus a 
similar adjustment applies as in (10) and the destruction of livestock is calculated to be -
11.52% of total. This probably underestimates the loss due to the Civil War as the 
calculation leaves out the fall in agricultural production brought about by the forced 
displacement of villagers away from their cultivations as discussed in Section 3.  
 
(iii). Capital stock: The only information available about industrial losses is the number of 
factories being destroyed during the Civil War. To obtain an estimate of the destruction of 
capital stock, some simplifying assumptions are made: first, all industrial firms are assumed 
to be similar and producing the same output (q), and, second, capital stock (k) per production 
unit was the same before and after WW2. These imply that total industry output is Q=qN 
and its growth rate is given by dQ/Q=dN/N. With subscript PW denoting the prewar period 
1934-1938, the proportion of destroyed factories is written: 
𝑑𝑁𝐶𝑊
𝑁𝐶𝑊
=
𝑑𝑁𝐶𝑊
𝑑𝑁𝑃𝑊
∙
𝑁𝑃𝑊
𝑁𝐶𝑊
∙
𝑑𝑁𝑃𝑊
𝑁𝑃𝑊
=
𝑑𝑁𝐶𝑊
𝑑𝑁𝑃𝑊
∙
𝑄𝑃𝑊
𝑄𝐶𝑊
∙
𝑑𝑄𝑃𝑊
𝑄𝑃𝑊
     (11) 
Industrial output in 1949 had reached 90% of its prewar level,23 thus 𝑁𝐶𝑊/𝑁𝑃𝑊 =
𝑄𝐶𝑊/𝑄𝑃𝑊 = 0.90. Table 4 displays the annual growth rate of industrial output and the 
number of new factories set up during 1934-1938, (i.e.  𝑑𝑄𝑃𝑊/𝑄𝑃𝑊 and 𝑑𝑁𝑃𝑊 respectively). 
Rizospastis (2011, p 564) reports that  𝑑𝑁𝐶𝑊 = −241 factories, thus the reduction of 
industrial capital stock can be calculated from (11) to be equal to -15.76% of its initial 
level.24 
                                                          
23 As reported by Stathakis (2002, p 66). 
24 Similar estimates are found for the destruction in infrastructure; for example, Babanassis (2001) reports that 
15% of rail lines were destroyed because of the conflict. 
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Elasticities of livestock and capital stock are approximated by the relative shares of their 
income in total value added. The share of non-agricultural capital income is obtained as 
η=0.360 in 1954, the nearest period where disaggregated data are available, while a similar 
calculation for agricultural income gives ε=0.315; for details see Christodoulakis et al (1996, 
p212). Substituting into (9), total drop in output by the end of conflict is found to be -11.84% 
or ψ=-2.84% per year in average during the period 1946-1949.   
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) assert that if conditions return to normal after the termination of 
hostilities, losses continue for another 21 years before GDP reaches the level that would 
have prevailed without the conflict. After peace is established, a growth rebound of around 
1% per year takes place and then gradually peters out as the economy returns to normal. 
Though such assertions are hard to apply universally and the trajectory of a post-conflict 
economy is influenced by highly idiosyncratic events, the Collier-Hoeffler time frame is a 
useful benchmark to compare losses across various civil wars.  
 
Applying this frame to the Greek Civil War, the cumulative output losses are evaluated at 
present value in the beginning of the Civil War by the following formula: 
 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 = ∑
𝑌0−𝑌𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡−1946
1970
𝑡=1946         (12) 
Output index is set at Y0 =100 and then evaluated in each period by  𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡−1(1 + 𝑔𝑡), 
while (r ) denotes the discount rate. The growth rate is set at gt =ψ=-2.84% for the civil war 
period t=1946-1949 and afterwards by the formula: 
𝑔𝑡 = 𝜓 + 𝑏 ∗ (1 − 𝛿)
𝑡−1950      (13) 
The rebound effect is denoted by b=1% and δ is the rate at which it peters out.  Letting a 
period of 21 years for recovery, a rate of δ=16% is calibrated to imply that by 1970 the Civil 
War consequences had petered out as schematically is illustrated in Fig. 8.  
Discounted at 5% annually, total losses in (12) amount to 129% of an annual GDP.25 The 
loss estimate exceeds the upper side of the confidence interval [90÷110%] found by 
                                                          
25 Averof (2010, p 385) asserts that material destruction due to the civil war amounted to USD 250 million in 
1948 prices. By further adding damages in dwellings, refugees’ costs and labour time forgone, the loss is raised to 
USD one billion in 1948 prices. Greek GDP in 1948 was Drs 63,706 million or $ 1,319 million in 1948 prices; 
(the 1970 exchange rate was 30 Drs/$ and US CPI 1970/1948 was 1.61). Thus, the estimate represents 75.82% of 
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Collier and Hoeffler (2007) to express cumulative GDP losses due to a relatively costly 
civil war. This is because the average Greek drop was below -2.20%, the annual growth 
loss found by the authors to accrue in other conflict-stricken economies.  
 
The cost of conflict escalation 
In addition to the estimation of losses caused by the Civil War, the growth-accounting 
framework may also be used to assess the effect that counterfactual developments could 
have had on the conflict burden. As analyzed in Section 4, after the escalation of fighting 
in 1948 the conflict reached yet another stalemate and was terminated only after a major 
offensive against guerrillas took place in the summer of 1949. The scale of the operation 
was unprecedented and so were its consequences in terms of battle casualties, material 
resources and overall destruction. Moreover, the overwhelming defeat of the guerrillas 
was used by the Government as the long-awaited opportunity for setting up a regime of 
repression and exclusion for decades to come.  
The particular cost associated with the final offensive can be assessed in two steps as 
follows: first, evaluate the losses that would have accrued in the hypothetical case that an 
end of hostilities was negotiated just before the final offensive was launched. Then, by 
comparing the losses in the counterfactual and the actual case, an estimate of the 
escalation cost is obtained.  
Assuming that an end to hostilities was negotiated in June 1949, the following 
characteristics would have prevailed: 
(a) Casualties would be lower by those perished in the battles of July and August 1949, 
and similarly for the number of seriously wounded. 
(b) Expatriation would have been altogether avoided. 
(c) Imprisoned political rivals would have been released and re-enter active population 
soon afterwards. Given that most of the executions were already carried out by June 
1949, the assumption does not apply to those sentenced to death. 
(d) The destruction of capital stock and livestock is assumed to be the same as in the 
actual case, since the final confrontation took place in the mountains and had little 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
annual GDP in 1948, roughly two thirds of the present estimate. The difference is probably due to the fact that 
Averof leaves out of calculation the losses in human capital due to forced expatriation and imprisonment. 
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direct effect on urban or rural establishments. This implies that the rate at which the 
post-conflict rebound peters out is also assumed to be the same. 
As seen in the last column of Table 4, there would have been 117,139 fewer human 
losses, or 51% lower than what actually happened. With active population increased by 
their participation and economic activity recovering more quickly, the Civil War effect 
on GDP would peter out in the early 1960s, rather than seven years later as shown in Fig. 
8. Following the same accounting framework as before, GDP losses are now evaluated at 
90% of an annual GDP. Therefore, the cost produced by the final offensive in summer 
1949 is estimated around 39% of GDP, more than a quarter of total losses. Other 
counterfactual exercises may similarly be quantified. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Using a new set of data on battle outcomes between the Greek National Army and the 
Democratic Army of Greece, the paper examined the dynamics of conflict in the Civil 
War that ravaged the country during 1946-1949. In the first phase that lasted until late 
1947, no clear winner emerged and the conflict seemed to have been trapped in repetitive 
fighting. To overcome the stalemate, both the Government and the guerrillas escalated 
the conflict by increasing recruitment and heavily relying on foreign support from US 
and Eastern Europe respectively. But, despite the escalation of the conflict, a new 
stalemate soon emerged involving higher levels of casualties, more material destruction 
and further suffering for the country. 
In attempting to explain the paradox, a modified Lotka-Volterra model is estimated over 
the two phases. The econometric findings suggest that despite the numerical and 
logistical improvements in the state army, its supremacy was still not enough to secure a 
quick victory over the guerrillas and the fighting could perpetuate around a new (and 
deadlier) conflict trap. It is also found that purges against political sympathizers of the 
insurgents turned several of them into guerrillas, thus further aggravating the conflict. 
Such an impasse could have been resolved either by a negotiated termination of 
hostilities or by a massive new escalation that would exhaust the resources of the 
opponent.  
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The first option required the introduction and empowerment of institutions that promote 
social equity and participation in public life. Though this is not always sufficient to 
uproot the causes of a civil strife, it has proved quite efficient in alleviating an internal 
conflict in postwar Western Europe. For example, in Belgium the risk of a civil conflict 
was high in the aftermath of WW2 but finally subsided after a major reconciliation 
between the rival sides was reached; for an account see Conway (2012). Similarly in 
Italy, the civil war was avoided after the Communist Party denounced the armed struggle 
and accepted the Constitution despite the pressure exercised by domestic and outside 
hardliners to engage in a power conflict.26 
In Greece, however, a similar reconciliation was never truly sought after by either side. 
The conflict ended only after a major military operation was organized by the 
Government troops to remove the guerrilla strongholds in northern Greece.  As a 
consequence, human and material losses multiplied and the cost inflicted upon the 
economy reached very high levels. Still, this was not the end of the dire consequences. A 
meticulous system of policing enforced the exclusion of political rivals from public life 
and several economic activities, thus emigration was their only option and resulted to 
further losses being accumulated long after civil war hostilities had ended. Part of the 
exclusion politics against guerrillas and their kin survived even after the restoration of 
parliamentary democracy in 1974. It was only in 1982 that all discriminations related to 
Civil War actions were dropped and expatriates were allowed to return to Greece without 
facing prosecution. To quantify the economic cost, the destruction and subsequent 
exclusion of factors of production were calculated in a growth accounting framework and 
total loss was found to substantially exceed an annual GDP.  
The main conclusions of the paper are summarized as follows: 
First, a conflict that initially involves low scale hostilities may soon be trapped in a 
stalemate. Unless a breakthrough takes place or adversaries negotiate an end of 
hostilities, fighting will become repetitive with no clear termination in sight. 
Second, extending and spreading up hostilities may not necessarily speed up the 
resolution of conflict. Unless some structural characteristics of fighting alter in a drastic 
                                                          
26 Applebaum (2012, p 49) describes that the Communist International in Moscow was training key Italian 
communists to seize power in postwar Italy. According to Rizas (2001), the leadership of the Italian Communist 
Party was severely reprimanded by Moscow for its failure to act according to Stalin’s expectations.  
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way, the model predicts that the escalation will rather drive the adversaries to a higher 
level of fighting stalemate.  
Third, exiting a conflict trap by a major escalation of force may entail a huge cost in 
human and material resources. The burden was found to be so high in Greece that a 
negotiated end of hostilities should have been an absolute priority for both adversaries. 
A final remark is perhaps in place as social violence and political extremism re-emerge in 
today’s Greece as a consequence of the deep economic crisis and some lessons of history 
may be worth recalling. The present study showed that if one starts with deeply divisive 
politics, even a low-scale confrontation is likely to escalate into a self-perpetuated 
conflict with immense costs for all the sides involved. Better take care so that the streams 
of social discontent never escape the Aeolus’ windbag.  
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Table 1. Key statistics of battle deaths and casualties 
 
 
Total battle deaths Total casualties 
Unit root test 
46:07-49:08 
-1.466 (p=0.53) -1.027 (p=0.733) 
Jarque_Bera 2.72 (p=0.255) 2.98 (p=0.225) 
Correlation 
(j=0) 
0.828 0.801 
Lag (j= -1) 0.435 0.533 
Period Breaking points (Statistics for detrended series) 
47:12 F=0.31 LLR= 0.278 0.0722; 0.0530 
48:01 0.126; 0.099 0.0072; 0.0041 
48:02 0.0775; 0.0574 0.0076; 0.0043 
48:03 0.0187;  0.0117 0.0019; 0.0009 
Statistics 
Phase I 
47:07-47:12 
Phase II 
48:01-49:08 
Phase I 
47:07-47:12 
Phase II 
48:01-49:08 
Mean 454 1714 1165 9023 
Std dev 340 629 848 3150 
Volatility % 75% 37% 73% 35% 
Pareto c.c.d.f. 
index (λ) 
0.396 1.55 0.62 1.60 
 
Note: (F) denotes the F-statistic and LLR the likelihood ratio 
Sources: Data as defined in Appendix A and Table A1.  
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Table 2. Battle dynamics 
 
Dependent 
variable   
Independent 
variable   
Phase I 
46:07- 47:12  
Phase II 
48:01- 49:09  
Wald test 
across 
Phases 
 
Guerrillas’  
battle deaths 
State’s  
battle 
deaths 
Guerrillas’ 
battle deaths 
State’s 
battle 
deaths 
 
Guerrillas’  
adversity (θ) 
0.145* 
(1.79) 
 
1.088*** 
(3.95) 
 p=0.03 
State army’s  
adversity (φ) 
 
0.0672*** 
(3.40) 
 
0.237*** 
(4.02) 
p=0.01 
Guerrillas’  
survival rate (-α) 
-1.068** 
(2.56) 
 
-1.156*** 
(6.00) 
  p=0.65 
State army firing 
effectiveness  (β) 
7.17* 
(1.84) 
 
1.267*** 
(3.34) 
 p=0.00 
State army’s  
survival rate (-γ) 
 
-1.128*** 
(4.44) 
 
-1.697*** 
(7.20) 
p=0.03 
Guerrillas’ firing 
effectiveness  (δ) 
 
0.940** 
(2.54) 
 
0.664*** 
(4.59) 
p=0.07 
nobs 18 18 21 21 
 
R2 adj 0.257 0.518 0.646 0.715 
 
S.E.  0.245 0.037 0.433 0.127 
 
DW 1.677 1.713 1.615 1.563  
F-stat (prob) 
3.94 
(0.042) 
10.15 
(0.002) 
19.3 
(0.00) 
26.1 
(0.00) 
 
High equilibrium 0.628 0.125 1.651 0.395  
Eigenvalues 
(unstable) 
-1.18 and 5.78 -0.52 and 2.13 
 
Low equilibrium 0.227 0.074 1.451 0.324  
Eigenvalues 
(stable) 
0.08 and 0.42 -0.02  and 0.88 
 
Historical 
average 
0.309 0.084 1.364 0.370 
 
Notes: Variables in ’000s, t-statistics in brackets. One, two or three stars indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. For the F-statistics, probabilities are 
in brackets. The Wald test is under the null that coefficients remain unchanged between the 
two phases. Data series are as in Table A1. 
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Table 3. Regional guerrilla formations 
 
Dependent 
variable   
Independent 
variable   
Guerrillas’ spatial 
concentration 
 1948:01 1949:03-1949:07 
constant 
-5839.79** 
(3.13) 
-1288.33* 
(1.87) 
Early 
persecutions  
1945-1946 
0.497** 
(2.90)  
Court-martial 
prosecutions 
7/1946-12/1948 
 
0.4289** 
(2.11) 
Mountain 
Altitude (m) 
3.090** 
(3.07) 
1.128*** 
(2.88) 
Distance from 
borders  (km) 
- 
-2.409*** 
(3.41) 
Method OLS 
OLS,  
Period effects 
Nobs 11x1 21x5 
R2 adj 0.799 0.246 
F-stat  
(prob) 
20.97 
(0.0006) 
5.18 
(0.00) 
 
Note: Data as defined in Appendix A and Tables A2, A3. 
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Table 4: Human toll and GDP losses due to the Civil War 
 
Factors of production Actual losses 
Termination 
In June 1949 
                                             Human capital  
1 Total battle  deaths        43,452 38,328 
2 Seriously wounded (b=2a)        86,904 76,656 
3 Ex-patriated by KKE        55,881 0 
4 Sentenced to death          4,832     4,664 
5 Sentenced to more than 10 years        45,718 0 
6 Total losses in human capital, (1) to (5)  236,787 119,648 
7 Active population 1951 2,800,413  
8 As % of active population  adjusted by the losses  -7.80% -3.94% 
Industry  
9 Industry, growth rate 1934-1938, annual  
average 
7.3%  
10 New factories 1934-1938, annual average 124  
11 Factories destroyed during the GCW 241  
12 As % of industrial units -15.76%  
Livestock  
13 Destruction  during 1946-1949 (animals) 1,480,669  
14 Livestock in 1950 (animals)       
11,374,600 
 
 
15 As % of livestock adjusted by the losses -11.52%  
Growth accounting  
16 Non-agricultural capital remuneration, % GDP 1954 0.360  
17 Agricultural income, as % GDP 1954 0.315  
18 Estimated growth rate loss during GCW -2.84% -2.43% 
19 Total GDP loss discounted at 5% 128.55% 89.70% 
Notes and data sources: 
1.   The sum of data series SKLD+RKLD. Averof (2010, pp 384-385) claims that battle deaths 
were 36,839 guerrillaguerrillas and 14,356 from GNA. Thus present calculation  may be 
conservative. 
2.    Seriously wounded are estimated as twice the number of deaths. 
3.    Papathanasiou (2002, p 147). Of those 17,352 were children, but here are accounted as active 
population as most of them  reached working age within a few years. 
(4, 5).  Michiotis (2007, pp 235-239). 
7.  ESYE (1951, Table 1, pp 2-9). 
(9,10).  ESYE (1939, Table B1, pp 123-124). 
(11, 13). As quoted in Rizospastis (2011, p 564). 
(14).   ESYE (1958, Table IX, p XXIV). Small animals not included.   
(16,17).  Christodoulakis et al (1996, p 212). 
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Fig. 1. Total casualties (upper graph, rhs) and battle deaths (marked graph, lhs), 1946:01-1949:12.  
The beginning of Civil War is marked in July 1946 and its end in August 1949. The shaded area in 
1948 marks a structural break into two phases. Source: Data are described in Appendix A and 
listed in Table A1. 
 
 
 Fig. 2. The size of  GNA (lhs) and DAG (rhs) armies, January 1947-December 1949  
 Source: Data described in Appendix A and Table A1. 
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Fig. 3. The costs of military aid delivered to Greece on behalf of the GNA. 
Source: JUSMAGG 1949, Diagram Funds and Costs, Greek Military Aid Program, 
Ground and Air.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Monthly changes in the DAG forces and aggregate displacements lagged one 
period. Source: Data described in Appendix A and Table A1. 
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Fig. 5. Total prosecutions and death penalties in the emergency martial courts.  
Source: Michiotis 2007, Tables 1 and 2, pp 235-236. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Fig. 6a. Positive conflict equilibria. Fig. 6b. Values in the pointed areas give 
rise to positive conflict equilibria. 
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Fig. 7. Ratio of DAG to GNA battle-deaths, monthly data. 
Source: Data defined in Appendix A and Table A1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. A schematic representation of GDP recovery 
(a) With Civil War casualties and persecutions as actually happened. 
(b) Counterfactual termination of hostilities in June 1949.  
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Appendix A: Data and sources 
Nomenclature 
Nomenclature of the Greek Civil War was never agreeable and each side was offensively 
labeling its opponents. For the Government, the army was the Greek National Army 
(GNA) while its rivals were ‘bandits’, ‘robber-bandits’ or even  ‘Slav-gangs’. The 
communists had proclaimed the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) and brandished the 
Government as ‘imperialist lackeys’ and its forces as ‘monarchist-fascist troops’, as well 
as ‘robber-bandits’ by reciprocation. The conflict itself was accordingly called ‘contra-
bandit struggle’ or ‘liberation struggle’ by the Government and the communists 
respectively. It was mutually described as a ‘civil war’ only in the 1980s. The present 
paper adopts a terminology as close as possible to each side’s preferences for its own 
troops. Thus GNA stands for Government troops, army soldiers and state forces, while 
guerrillas, fighters and rebel forces (‘andartes’) are interchanged in describing DAG. 
 
Data sources 
ESYE, 1939, Annuaire Statistique de la Grèce 1939. Athens. 
ESYE, 1946, Population de la Grèce 1940. Athens. 
ESYE, 1955, Population de la Grèce 1951. Athens. 
ESYE, 1958,  Results of Agricultural Census of Year 1950. Athens. 
 
GES, 1970, The Greek Army in the Anti-guerrilla Struggle 1946-49: The cleansing of 
Roumeli and the first battle of Grammos. Athens, (in Greek). 
 
GES, 1971, The Greek Army in the Anti-guerrilla Struggle 1946-49: The first year of the 
anti-guerrilla struggle 1946. Athens, (in Greek). 
GES, 1976, The Greek Army in the Anti-guerrilla Struggle 1946-49: Operations of the 
Third Army Corps 1947-1949. Athens, (in Greek). 
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GES, 1980, The Greek Army in the Anti-guerrilla Struggle 1946-49: The second year of 
the anti-guerrilla struggle 1947. Athens, (in Greek). 
JUSMAPG, History, 1948-1950, National Archives, US. 
Michiotis N., 2007, In the name of the King: Emergency martial courts in Greece 1946-
1960. Athens: Synchroni Epochi editions (in Greek). 
Grammenos, B. and P. Rodakis, (1987) That’s how Civil War started. Reproduction of 
“The 1947 DAG Report to the UN”. Athens: Glaros editions. 
 
Battle data 
State army (GNA) figures include the Army, Gendarmerie and armed nationalist groups.  
Guerrilla figures (DAG) include the fighters and civilians involved in skirmishes. Figures 
for 1946 are from GES (1971) as follows:  
January-June 1946, monthly aggregates of all battles and skirmishes, classified by the 
author.  
Figures for the period July-December 1946 are from Tables pp 54, 87, 93, 99, 110, 158 
and 165.  Data from GES (1980) are per military operation with the following 
adjustments: aggregate data for January and February 1947 are split equally per month; 
for Operation Korax (pp 173, 179) figures split into May and June; for Operation Lelaps 
(p 257) into August and September.  
Figures for surrendered guerrillas in 1946 are from GES (1971, Table VII, p 235). For 
1947, data are from GES (1980) for the areas under the A and B Army Corps, and GES 
(1976) for the areas under the C Army Corps. For 1947, data are from GES (1980), 
Diagrams 4 & 5, pp 386-387.  
Data for the period 1948-1949 are from US military archives: JUSMAPG History, 1948, 
1949.  
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Variables  
Note: If not stated otherwise, sources are as described in the previous subsections. 
DAG : Number of guerrilla fighters with the Democratic Army of Greece, monthly.  
DHQ_area: Number of DAG fighters grouped per headquarter and mountain formation. 
Source: Data for January 1948, January to July 1949, September and December 1949 are 
from JUSMAPG, History, 1948-1949, maps. 
DISPL : Total number of evacuees from villages in Northern Greece. Source: Laiou 
(1987, Table II, 2. Displaced persons in Northern Greece, per prefecture). 
DISTNB: Distance of DAG HQs from northern borders in km; calculated by the author. 
GNA: Number of personnel in the Greek National Army, monthly figures. 
MOUNT: Altitude of mountains, compiled by the author. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mountains_in_Greece     
PROSEC: Number of leftwing citizens prosecuted in the emergency martial courts during 
1946-51. Initially martial courts were established in eleven cities, but as civil war was 
intensifying they were extended to thirty areas. Allocation is similar to that used for 
persecutions in 1945-46. Source: Michiotis (2007, Tables 1 & 2, pp 235-236).  
PURGE: Number of persons persecuted and victimized during 1945-46 as described in 
DAG (1947). Data cover seven areas close to guerrilla HQs in Central and Northern 
Greece as explained in Grammenos and Rodakis (1987, pp 383-390). To correspond the 
data to more disaggregated guerrilla formations the seven regions are artificially split as 
shown in Table 5. Source: Rizospastis (2011, pp 138-140). 
RCAP: Guerrillas captured, monthly. 
RKLD: Battle deaths of DAG, monthly. 
RSUR: Guerrillas surrendered to GNA, monthly. 
RWND: Wounded guerrillas, monthly. 
SKLD: Battle deaths of GNA, monthly. 
SMIA: GNA soldiers missing in action, monthly. 
SWND: Wounded of GNA, monthly. 
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TABLE A1. Conflict data 1946-1949, in persons 
 
GNA SKLD SWND SMIA DAG RKLD RWND RCAP RSUR ABDUCT DISPL 
Jan 1946  5 4 0 
 
3 4 36 
  
 
Feb 1946  0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
  
 
Mar 1946  11 5 0 
 
0 0 1 
  
 
Apr 1946  4 8 0 
 
4 12 15 
  
 
May 1946  8 16 0 
 
1 0 0 
  
 
Jun 1946  22 12 17 
 
10 5 62 6
 
 
Jul 1946  24 35 40 
 
65 32 146 
  
 
Aug 1946  50 58 52 
 
52 0 45 31
 
 
Sep 1946  126 81 82 
 
85 43 36 134 
 
 
Oct 1946  22 42 34 
 
139 70 61 43 
 
 
Nov 1946  108 83 70 
 
123 62 26 27 
 
 
Dec 1946  120 81 141 
 
115 57 52 118 
 
 
Jan 1947 92,000 49 58 101 10850 130 86 21 19 812  
Feb 1947  36 49 109 14850 128 84 37 15 1508  
Mar 1947  65 74 72 16250 280 143 31 7 794 28,651 
Apr 1947  94 171 26 17050 838 185 756 246 1062  
May 1947  92 127 115 16450 804 381 477 249 852  
Jun 1947  61 170 21 16900 608 271 517 362 1403 140,880 
Jul 1947  151 324 110 16900 1139 726 306 217 2085  
Aug 1947  92 206 155 16700 357 167 63 28 1933 159,191 
Sep 1947  46 85 22 17400 269 76 72 30 2213  
Oct 1947  93 304 39 18600 499 131 484 327 3047  
Nov 1947  121 434 44 18600 541 320 210 115 2851  
Dec 1947  167 460 146 20350 494 203 88 143 1491  
Jan 1948 120,098 176 383 264 22250 835 2505 609 446 3650 270,727 
Feb 1948 132,000 129 337 135 24140 731 2193 553 486 1500 287,239 
Mar 1948  266 685 230 25700 1459 4377 968 999 2000  
Apr 1948  241 799 316 23900 1371 4113 1059 599 1600  
May 1948  248 609 162 25610 1301 3903 1527 931 810  
Jun 1948  321 983 345 23300 1304 3912 579 579 1062 348,772 
Jul 1948  601 2433 172 22090 1817 5451 690 839 1404 346,831 
Aug 1948  626 3258 158 21100 1896 5688 634 701 3010  
Sep 1948  412 1854 207 23720 1831 5493 635 833 2473  
Oct 1948  324 1241 167 25480 1012 3036 332 619 3600 320,168 
Nov 1948  294 875 455 25450 891 2673 588 554 1924  
Dec 1948  205 618 192 24000 1279 3837 741 670 1848 294,906 
Jan 1949  225 681 271 24090 1375 4125 657 931 1500  
Feb 1949  253 1222 792 21810 1846 5538 1264 791 1730  
Mar 1949  140 426 37 19450 1894 5682 2219 1263 319  
Apr 1949  275 1074 336 20200 1924 5772 1034 1020 415  
May 1949  221 817 146 18320 1161 3483 1133 1049 720  
Jun 1949  266 662 246 17365 927 2781 1199 781 100  
Jul 1949  192 599 42 17400 653 1959 696 573 143  
Aug 1949  771 3712 73 3580 2588 7764 1543 566 32  
Sep 1949  
   
2410 551 1653 442 362 20  
Oct 1949  
   
1910 173 519 450 464 11  
Nov 1949  
   
1275 100 300 194 283 16  
Dec 1949 128,701 
   
96 96 288 126 150 0  
Notes: For definitions of variables and data sources see Appendix A. 
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Table A2:  DAG regional formations and allocation of persecutions 
 
 Formation 
Nearby mountain 
formations  
Allocation of 
purges 
1945-1946 
Allocation of  
prosecutions 
1946-1949 
Purges 
1945-1946 
Prosecutions 
1946-1948 
1 Evia  23% of FFE Thiva 
644 671 
2 Parnassos 
Vardousia 
Panetolikon 
50% of FFE 
Athens, Lamia/2, 
Mesologi/2 
1399 1671 
3 Othrys Magnesia 27% of FFE Lamia/2, Volos 
755 1137 
4 Agrafa 
Tzoumerka, 
Xinias,Souli 
Arta,Trikala,  
Karditsa  
Trikala 
1109 1136 
5 Pindos 
Smolikas, Orliakas 
Zagoria, Mourgana 
Ioannina/2 Ioannina/2 
4065 587 
6 Hasia 
Antihasia, Koziakas, 
Kamvounia 
50% Pieria 
& Larissa 
Larissa/2 
2000 1410 
7 Olympos 
Pieria,  
Ossa 
50% Pieria 
& Larissa 
Larissa/2 
2000 1410 
8 Vermion Siniatsiko,Vourinos 50% of KGIP Kozani/2 
1417 1077 
9 Grammos  
Ioannina/2 
Kastoria/2 
Ioannina/2 
Kastoria/2 
5223 1636 
10 Vitsi  
Kastoria/2, 
Florina 
Kastoria/2 
Florina 
3860 2625 
11 Kaimktsalan Paikon 50% of KGIP 
Kozani/2, 
Veria 
1416 1077 
12 Belles 
Korona,  
Krousia 
 Kilkis  
405 
13 Halkidiki Kerdylia, Pangaion  Thessaloniki/2  
1651 
14 Serres Orvilos  
Serres, 
Thessaloniki/2 
 
1651 
15 Haidu Boz-Dag  Drama  
1704 
16 Thrace Vyrsini, Sapka  
Xanthi, 
Alexandroupoli 
 
1744 
17 Lesvos   Mytilene/2  
94 
18 Samos Icaria  Mytilene/2  
94 
19 Hania Lefka Ori  Hania  
448 
20 Cephalonia Enos  Mesologi/2  
0 
21 Peloponnese   
Patras, Tripoli, 
Corinth,Calamata 
 
3083 
 TOTAL    
23,888 25,308 
Notes: FFE denotes the areas of Fthiotis, Fokis and Evia combined. Shares in local purges are 
set equal to the regional population shares in total population of Sterea (excluding Attica), 
according to the 1951 Census. KGIP denotes the areas defined by Kozani, Grevena, Imathia 
and Pella combined. 
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Table A3:  DAG regional formations and morphology 
 
 
HQ 
Mount. 
height 
average 
Border 
distance 
Guerrilla forces (in persons) 
 
  
(m)  (km) Jan48 Mar49 Apr49 May49 Jun49 July49 Sep49 Dec49 
1 Evia 1,743 350 120 160 150 150 150 150 130 24 
2 Parnas 2,292 300 1,600 210 650 720 280 100 50 42 
3 Othris 1,726 250 400 110 200 50 250 110 40 64 
4 Agrafa 2,069 200 1,600 2,750 1,460 1,100 400 260 200 0 
5 Pindos 1,994 50 1,500 250 400 650 430 330 390 34 
6 Hasia 1,626 150 550 800 1,030 550 70 40 120 20 
7 Olympos 2,084 150 700 1,140 550 1,300 360 500 270 92 
8 Vermion 2,014 100 550 300 350 350 500 340 230 55 
9 Grammos 2,520 1 5,500 1,450 4,000 4,300 4,800 4,850 0 0 
10 Vitsi 2,128 30 2,500 7,500 6,000 5,600 7,100 7,400 0 0 
11 Kaimktsalan 2,087 50 1,500 860 830 900 780 350 80 20 
12 Belles 1,445 1 600 750 730 1,530 1,430 1,430 0 80 
13 Halkidiki 1,404 100 630 340 160 150 160 160 260 100 
14 Serres 2,212 1 600 1,000 1,500 30 30 0 0 0 
15 Haidu 1,823 1 600 390 270 70 460 450 50 80 
16 Thrace 1,435 50 2,600 950 1,200 600 190 150 180 100 
17 Lesvos 967 300 
 
20 20 20 20 20 11 7 
18 Samos 1,434 500 
 
170 170 150 145 140 74 48 
19 Hania 2,452 800 
 
40 40 40 40 20 11 7 
20 Cefalonia 1,628 400 
 
20 20 20 20 20 10 7 
21 Peloponnese 1,981 400 800 250 60 40 90 80 50 31 
            
 
TOTAL 
  
21,550 19,210 19,730 18,280 17,615 16,820 2,106 780 
Note: For definitions of variables and data sources see Appendix A. 
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Appendix B: On the dynamics of conflict models 
Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 3 
Combining (3a, 3b), the steady-state R* is obtained as the positive root of the second-
order equation: 
𝛼𝛿𝑥2 − (𝛼𝛾 − 𝜃𝛿 − 𝜑𝛽)𝑥 + 𝜃𝛾 = 0     (14a) 
Let (D) denote the discriminant: 
𝐷 = (𝛼𝛾 + 𝜃𝛿 − 𝜑𝛽)2 − 4𝛼𝛾𝛿𝜃     (14b) 
Two, one or none positive solutions exist depending on whether D>0, D=0 or D<0 
respectively. The discriminant is expanded as: 
𝐷 = (𝛼𝛾)2 − 2(𝛼𝛾)(𝜑𝛽 + 𝜃𝛿) + (𝜑𝛽 − 𝜃𝛿)2    (14c) 
 This expression looks like a second-order function of (αγ) with roots  (𝜌1, 𝜌2) given by 
the expressions: 
𝜌1 = [√𝜑𝛽 − √𝜃𝛿 ]
2
      (15a) 
𝜌2 = [√𝜑𝛽 + √𝜃𝛿 ]
2
      (15b) 
Discriminant (D) is positive if  𝛼𝛾 < 𝜌1 or 𝛼𝛾 > 𝜌2, negative if  𝜌1 < 𝛼𝛾 <  𝜌2, and zero 
if  𝛼𝛾 = 𝜌1 or  𝜌2. Substituting (𝜌1, 𝜌2) from (15a, 15b), the three Propositions in Section 
4 are readily obtained.  
 
Autonomous models of conflict 
An autonomous system with lagged interaction between the adversaries is written as: 
∆𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡−1 ∙ [−𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡−1]      (16a) 
∆𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡−1 ∙ [−𝛾 + 𝛿𝑅𝑡−1]     (16b) 
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Four steady-states (R*, S*) are obtained at (0,0), (0,α/β), (γ/δ,0), (γ/δ, α/β) and the 
following Jacobian matrices are formed respectively: 
𝐽1 = [
1 − 𝛼 0
0 1 − 𝛾
] , 𝐽2 = [
1 0
𝛼𝛿
𝛽
1 − 𝛾] , 𝐽3 = [
1 − 𝛼
𝛽𝛾
𝛿
0 1
] , 𝐽4 = [
1
𝛽𝛾
𝛿
𝛼𝛿
𝛽
1
]   (17) 
The characteristic roots are respectively obtained as the following pairs (1 − 𝛼, 1 −
𝛾), (1, 1 − 𝛾), (1 − 𝛼, 1) and (1 ± √𝛼𝛾).  In the first case of trivial equilibrium stability 
holds only if α>0 and γ>0.  The second and third cases are indeterminate, while the 
fourth case with possible non-trivial equilibria is always unstable. A non-trivial unstable 
limit cycle occurs only if αγ<0, i.e. when one of the survival parameters turns negative. 
However, this implies that one of the armies becomes self-destructive and is ruled out.27  
Similar problems arise in autonomous systems of continuous-time interaction. Omitting 
subscripts for simplicity, the model takes the form:  
?̇? = 𝑅 ∙ [−𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆]      (18a) 
?̇? = 𝑆 ∙ [−𝛾 + 𝛿𝑅]     (18b) 
The non-zero equilibrium is the same as in (16a, 16b) and it is easy to check that the 
corresponding Jacobian has eigenvalues equal to ±√𝛼𝛾. Thus if αγ>0 the system is 
unstable, while for αγ<0 it becomes indeterminate with a limit cycle. For the non-zero 
steady-state (R*=γ/δ, S*=α/β) to be meaningful, the condition αγ<0 requires that βδ<0, 
again implying improbable opposite behaviors for the two fighting sides.  
 
                                                          
27 Past casualties lead to more losses in the future if the army is either constantly depleted from critical support 
units or is panic stricken after a major defeat. However, none of them is compatible with a prolonged conflict. 
Losses can also be self-multiplied in suicidal insurgencies where a new wave of martyrs follows those previously 
perished but, again, this cannot last for very long. 
